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11 JAN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: Acting Deputy Director for Administration  
FROM: ☒ Director of Security  
SUBJECT: Release of Polygraph Questions and Answers  
to the Department of Justice -  
Tscherim Soobzokov (C)

1. (U) Action Requested: This memorandum contains a recommendation for your approval.

2. (C) Background: The United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York is conducting an investigation of Tscherim Soobzokov to determine if he procured his naturalization by fraud and to ascertain whether he is involved in a fraud on the Social Security Administration. Office of Security concern in this case involves the possible release of detailed polygraph information regarding Subject to the Department of Justice.

(C) Pursuant to their request, Department of Justice attorneys were permitted to review the sanitized Office of Security file on Soobzokov (which was originally prepared for concurrent review of Agency records on Soobzokov by the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law and the General Accounting Office as a result of their parallel investigations of alleged Nazi war criminals). They were authorized to take notes and request copies of documents determined relevant to their investigation which will be forwarded to them after appropriate review and any additional sanitization considered necessary.

(C) Every effort was made to be as forthcoming as possible with respect to the sanitization of this material and deletions were limited to sensitive Directorate of

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Operations information, Third Agency documents, employee names and actual polygraph reports. With respect to polygraph information, I feel that sufficient details were provided as manifested in the attached file summary. Unfortunately, this did not satisfy their interest and Assistant United States Attorney, Jerry Siegel, verbally requested all polygraph questions and answers reflected in the seven polygraph tests conducted by the Agency on Soobzokov. He will want copies of selected questions and answers which he feels are relevant to the investigation.

(C) While it is realized that these documents are subject to subpoena, I have serious reservations about permitting such an extensive review of our polygraph reports. I feel obligated to make every effort to protect this information for the following reasons:

a. If this information is utilized in a court of law, resultant publicity could leave the impression in the minds of the public that the Agency routinely releases polygraph information to this degree. Individuals of operational interest would certainly not be as inclined to undergo technical interviews if they felt that this was Agency policy. Consequently, it would jeopardize the recruitment and clearance processing of human sources of intelligence which are vital to the Agency's mission. The fact that the Agency is cognizant that this information was released solely because this is a criminal investigation is one thing, but convincing a potential source that this is a unique case would be difficult, to say the least.

b. The release of specific questions and answers recorded in polygraph examinations would damage the reliability and validity of our testing by enhancing the possibility that specific areas of interest could be identified. The value of such information to a hostile intelligence service for penetration purposes is obvious. The fact that in this case only selected items will be released does not negate my concern since I feel that we are setting a dangerous precedent here that can only lead to problems in the future when the Department of Justice may feel that entire polygraph reports are essential in a particular case.

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3. (C) Recommendation: The Department of Justice be advised that the Agency will continue to fulfill its obligation to provide relevant information to the fullest extent possible as long as Agency equities are protected. We will respond in summary form to any additional areas of interest concerning Soobzokov's polygraph file. However, we cannot comply with their request to review all of the polygraph questions and answers since it would jeopardize intelligence sources and methods.

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APPROVED:

Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED:

Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 16 JAN 1978

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SUBJECT: SOOBZOKOV, Tscherim  
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I. IDENTIFYING INFORMATION:

Office of Security files in the name Tscherim SOOBZOKOV reveal he was born between 1918 and 1924 in Tachtamakai, Caucasus, USSR. He has also been known as Tscherim SOOBZOKOV, Tscherim SOOBZOKOFF, Abdel-Karin SHOWABXQA, and Kerim ZOOBZOKO. See paragraph 2 for additional information.

II. CIA ASSOCIATION AND SECURITY ACTION:

The earliest action in Subject's security file is a 12 January 1953 memorandum pertaining to a 27 September 1952 request (not in file) for an operational clearance to permit Subject's use as a spotter in Transjordan. Results of Agency checks--all of which were no record or non-derogatory--were forwarded to the DDO for a determination regarding his operational use. (A gap exists in Subject's security file between this action and May 1955. However, a review in 1975 of his 201 file showed that a Provisional Operational Approval (POA) was granted 7 November 1952, and he was polygraphed 22 February 1953 in Beirut. Responding to their request, biographic information was sent to the State Department on 16 November 1953. The DDO project was terminated about April 1954 but as of 4 October 1954 Subject was being retained operationally. An Operational Approval (OA) was granted on 26 May 1955 (no additional information available).

The April 1953 polygraph disclosed evidence of evasion in Subject's background and the DDO requested he be repolygraphed to test the veracity of Subject and the accuracy of biographical information. The polygraph examiner tested him on 25 February 1956 concerning communism, Personal History Statement (PHS) falsification, and security indiscretions. He concluded there were no specific responses indicative of deception except possibly in the area of membership in or sympathy for communism, where some sensitivity was noted. During this interview Subject advised that he

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joined the German Army in 1942 and served until 1945. He was assigned as an officer, first to a North Caucasian volunteer unit and later to the Caucasian SS Division (Waffen SS) recruiting Caucasian prisoners of war into German fighting units. (Different versions surface later

Provisional and full Covert Security Approvals (CSA) were requested on 29 August 1956 to employ Subject as a covert associate. A partial covert background investigation was conducted by the New York Field Office (NYFO). Several informants derided his honesty and character and one advised there were reports to the effect that while Subject was in Jordan, he was actively engaged in Circassian politics on behalf of Soviet Intelligence. The informant pointed out that these were unverified rumors and may have emanated from a Caucasian group engaged in inter-factional squabbling with another group, which Subject represented. The earlier request was canceled and a new OA initiated to permit Subject's use in the United States as a hot war cadre trainee.

On 13 December 1956 Subject was polygraphed to resolve the discrepancies noted in previous examinations and allegations pertaining to Soviet connections. The examiner concluded that Subject may have been sympathetic to communism in the past but was no longer, and he has not been a member of the Communist Party. A POA was granted on 8 February 1957 which was immediately followed by a request for an OA. This request was canceled on 6 March 1957.

In order to resolve background discrepancies and check project security, Subject was again polygraphed from 21-24 August 1957. After three hours of interrogation, Subject admitted to falsifying his entire personal history prior to about 1945. He admitted to previously lying about his birth date, Komsomol membership, education, and military background. His story was that in regard to intelligence or irregular military activities, he started working about August 1942 for the Germans as Chief/Circassian Field Gendarmerie, a local force organized by the Germans to keep order and fight partisans. He remained chief of this unit until October 1942 when he requested transfer to a fighting unit after refusing to take part in blacklisting Soviet officials and Jews. About March 1944 the Germans made him responsible for rounding up Circassians for fighting units. Late in 1944 a German colonel convinced him to join the SS and promoted him to 1st Lieutenant. He was given the assignment of combing prisoner of war camps in Albania, Austria, Hungary, and elsewhere for Circassians to form a Moslem SS Division. He continued this activity until March/April 1945. Due to lack of time, his admissions were not re-checked on the polygraph.

On 9 October 1957, NYFO verified Subject's periods of employment with Mutual Life Insurance Company as a salesman from 1956-28 February 1957 and 16 September 1957 to the date of investigation. Two polygraphs were then administered in short order--one just prior to and the other after an operational mission to Jordan. At the conclusion of the first on 18 October 1957, the examiner expressed the opinion that Subject was not attempting to conceal any past or present connection with non-American intelligence services (both Soviet and German were specifically asked about) and was not fabricating any important part of his PHS. When he was polygraphed on 22 April 1958 about specific allegations concerning his behavior in the Middle East, Subject volunteered to previously falsifying biographic information. He also admitted to giving false information to the American Consulate in Jordan when seeking to emigrate to the United States. It was the examiner's opinion that Subject still had not completely told the true story.

From 28-30 October 1958 Subject was interviewed by the DDO case officer, during which some elements of his biography were reconciled. He stated that his true birth date was 24 August 1924 (both 1921 and 1918 had previously been used) and wrote a new autobiography outlining all details of his life. He stated he had used a false birth date to make himself appear older to be eligible for service in the local militia and had falsified his level of education to be eligible for officer rank and generally get a better deal. He added that the dates had become publicly accepted and he felt compelled to use them when applying for a U.S. visa. This material was subjected to a thorough review and a 4 March 1959 memorandum to the DDO concluded that Subject was still concealing some phases of his life in the USSR and recommended a still more thorough debriefing.

The final and most exhaustive polygraph and debriefing took place from 19-20 November 1959. Subject admitted to:

a. being recruited by a German SS or SD Intelligence officer in 1942 to act as an informer against his own people and was in the employ of German intelligence until he was wounded in February 1943;

b. being a semi-deserter from the German Army for eleven months after his release from hospital in the summer of 1943;

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c. corresponding with friends and relatives in the USSR since late 1957;

d. falsifying the extent of his education;

e. being in charge of an execution detail of a Soviet partisan, although he himself did not fire;

f. being present when several conspirators planning a mutiny were executed by firing squad (although working for German Intelligence in the military unit, he claimed to have no advance knowledge and had no part in reporting the conspiracy).

He denied ever signing any secrecy agreements or making written or oral reports to German Intelligence. He also stated that no Circassian or Soviet was ever punished on the basis of his reporting. At the conclusion, it was the examiner's opinion that Subject is an incorrigible fabricator and was still attempting deception about his past. Further, the reason he continued to attempt deception must be so important and pertinent to his welfare that he cannot afford to tell the complete truth about his past without seriously jeopardizing his future. A memorandum was forwarded to the DDO cautioning against Subject's use in future operations in light of the discrepancies. His Operational Approval was canceled on 4 April 1960.

### III. OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:

Department of State  
Immigration and Naturalization Service

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